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The Ohio Takeover Act: What
Is It?
A. A. Sommer, Jr.
The Laws of most kingdoms and states have been like
buildings of many pieces, and patched up from time to time
according to occasions without frame or model. Bacon, An
Offer to the King of a Digest to be Made of the Laws of
England.
I. INTRODUCTION
("IN JUNE 25, 1969, the Ohio House of Representatives,' follow-
V47 ing the lead of the Senate,' adopted the Ohio Tender Offer
Act and on July 10, 1969, the Governor signed it into law. This
represented a major achievement since the legislation had only
been introduced the previous
February 24, 1969; other legisla-
THE AUTHOR: A. A. SommR, JR., tion of apparently greater social
(A.B., University of Notre Dame; LLB., import languished for longer
Harvard University) is a practicing at-
torney in Cleveland, Ohio and is a mem- periods. Of even greater note
ber of the Ohio Bar. were the overwhelming votes in
both Houses of the Legislature
(30 to 2 in the Senate,4 76 to
13 in the House5), and the convergence of the leadership of both
parties, both the legislative and executive branches of government,
and both industry and labor in its support."
According to its preamble, the legislation was "for the purpose
of protecting shareholders of Ohio and Ohio-based corporations by
requiring public announcement and fair, full, and effective disclos-
ure to such shareholders prior to the making of take-over bids."7
A bill to require disclosure is hardly startling. Disclosure is at
the heart of the federal scheme of securities regulation, including
1 OHIo H.R. Jont. 14 (June 25, 1969).2 OHEo S. JouR. 4 (Apr. 22, 1969).
8 Ox-no Rm. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
CODE]. A,4 0m1o S. JouR., supra note 2, at 4.
5 Oio H.R. JouIL, supra note 1, at 14.
6 One writer remarked: 'The overwhelming Senate vote yesterday clearly nominated
the bill as the best lobbied piece of major special interest legislation of the current ses-
sion." The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Apr. 23, 1969, at 7-C, col. 4.
7 Amend. Sub. S.B. No. 138, File No. 90 (Reg. Sess. 1969-70).
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the Williams Act8 which regulates the making of tender offers,
and two earlier attempts by state legislatures to govern in general
the making of tender offers.9 In addition many state securities
laws have as key provisions the requirement of disclosure to would-
be investors.' °
Among legislation requiring disclosure the Ohio Act is perhaps
unique in that its provisions create a strong impression that its
purpose is not to improve disclosure in connection with tender of-
fers, but is rather to create a scheme of disclosure that will strongly
inhibit, if not render impossible, the making of tender offers with
respect to corporations which have the requisite relationship to
Ohio, not only in Ohio but everywhere else as well. That such
is the lurking purpose of the legislation has been bluntly acknowl-
edged by Arthur I. Vorys, one of the defenders of the legislation:
The real impact of the law, in my opinion, will be felt not so much
in its application as in its hovering omnipresence. I suspect, so far
as Ohio and Ohio-based corporations are concerned, the corporate
takeover as a form of corporate warfare is a thing of the past."
While purporting to protect shareholders, there is reason to be-
lieve that its provisions were really designed to place the manage-
ment of companies within its gambit beyond the pale of unfriendly
attack. The history of the legislation and the timing of its intro-
duction confirm this suspicion. Fortune magazine, in detailing the
successful defense of B. F. Goodrich Co. against the takeover at-
tempt of Northwest Industries, Inc., has said: "Meanwhile, mem-
bers of the Ohio Manufacturers Association, including a Goodrich
representative, were meeting in Cleveland to draft state legisla-
tion that would block or delay tender offers. A similar bill was
later co-sponsored by State Senator William Taft."' 2
This was not the first time that the Ohio legislature had ad-
dressed itself to the tender offer problem. Because they involve
the offer and sale of securities within the meaning of the term "sale"
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (Supp. IV, 1969).
0 Ch. 97, §§ 2-20, [1969] Nev. Acts 120-25; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -540
(Supp. 1968).
10 "Nearly half the stitutes either require the use of a prospectus or empower the
administrator to require it. In practice the filing of a prospectus is required
much more often than its use. But at least 16 jurisdictions do require either
by statute or by rule - statutory authority for the rule is not always too clear
- that a prospectus actually be used, at least in some cases." L. Loss & E.
COWETr, BLUE SKY LAW 305 (1958).
11 Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill, 43 OHIo BAR 65, 73 (1970) (emphasis added).
12 O'Hanlon, Goodrich's Four-Ply Defense, FORTUNE, July 1969, at 110, 113.
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in the Ohio Securities Law,18 exchange offers - offers of securi-
ties in exchange for other securities - have always been subject
to that law's provisions, as they are subject to the comparable stat-
utes of other states. 14 Moreover, even prior to the adoption of the
Act, Ohio had not remained quiescent in the face of cash tender
offers. When control of Glidden Corp., an Ohio corporation, was
sought by Greatamerica Corp., Glidden mounted not only a suc-
cessful counterattack in the federal court,'5 but in the Ohio Divi-
sion of Securities as well.16 Glidden contended that only a dealer
licensed in Ohio could make a tender offer because Ohio Revised
Code section 1701.14 forbade anyone to "engage in the business
of buying, selling, or dealing in securities otherwise than in trans-
actions through or with a licensed dealer, unless such person is
licensed as a dealer by the Division."' 7  The Division responded to
this argument by determining that the making of a tender offer
was conduct that could only be legally carried on by a licensed
dealer and ordered discontinuance of the offer until it was so
done by one.'8 Thereafter Greatamerica recommenced the offer
with the services of dealers licensed in Ohio. This administra-
tive interpretation was described in Layritz v. Condec Corp.9 as a
" 'one shot' Ohio administrative ex post facto interpretation." ''
That court rebuffed an effort to extend further the application of
the Ohio Securities Law in a case involving a combined cash and
security tender offer.
Perhaps because of the hostility evidenced by the court in
Condec, and certainly in response to the increased tempo of take-
over activity during 1968, Ohio corporations began to address them-
selves to the possibility of state legislation to inhibit takeover at-
tempts. Their concern was matched by that of their counterparts
in Pennsylvania, who, similarly assailed by possible losses of in-
dustry, prepared and began to seek adoption of a bill governing
tender offers.2 '
'3 CODE § 1707.01(c)(1) (Page 1964).
14L. Loss & E. CEw=Ir, supra note 10, at 34.
15 Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
16 Order of the Division of Securities, May 15, 1967.
'. CODH § 1707.14 (Page 1964).
'
8 Order of the Division of Securities, May 15, 1967.
19 Civil No. 6439 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
20ld.
21 Pennsylvania H.B. 841 (1969 Sess.).
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Initially a bill was drafted at the behest of an Ohio-based com-
pany, the most significant feature of which was the provision that
prior to the commencement of a tender offer there might be re-
quired a hearing by the Division which would have to determine
that the offer was "fair" and "that the disclosures relative [to it]
are fair and adequate. '22  This bill, simple and direct, omitted
virtually all the other unusual provisions incorporated in the mea-
sure which finally became law and was relatively confined in its
application.
In February 1969, a tender offer bill was introduced in the Ohio
Senate as an amendment to the Ohio Securities Law. After con-
siderable amendment which did nothing to blunt its anti-tender-
offer effect this bill was adopted.
Somewhat surprisingly the draftsmen of the Ohio Act chose to
number it Code section 1707.041, thereby apparently intending
to relate it somehow to the section concerned with certain types of
reorganizations.2m This designation endured through the legislative
process despite the statement of the Legislative Service Commis-
sion that it was inappropriate:
[I]t is doubtful that the bill's subject matter is truly supplemental
to section 1707.04 which deals with securities issued in connection
with a corporation reorganization. A take-over bid involves a pro-
posed change in control, and may or may not contemplate a reor-
ganization or a new issue of securities.
2 2 A copy of this proposal, never introduced, is in the files of the author.
237be Ohio Securities Law [CODE §§ 1707.01-A6 (Page 1964)], originally en-
acted in 1929, has been changed little through the years. Like the securities laws of
many jurisdictions, the Ohio Law requires both the licensing of dealers [id. § 1707.14]
and the registration of securities [id. §§ 1707.06-.101 and the Division of Securities
was given the power to bar from Ohio offers if it found they were on "grossly unfair
terms" or there was a failure to meet other criteria [id. § 1707.09]. Thus, exchange
offers had to be registered (barring the availability of a security or transaction exemp-
don) before the offering could be commenced in the state. Additionally, the offer
could only be made in "transactions through or with a licensed dealer." Id. § 1707.14(B).
In 1943 the Ohio Law was amended to include section 1707.04. This section ap-
pears to have been designed to permit, in certain circumstances, reliance upon the
exemption from registration under section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 [15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1964) (hereinafter cited as Securities Act)]. Section 3(a)(10)
exempts from the registration and prospectus provisions of section 5 of the Securities
Act lid. § 77e] certain transactions "where the terms and conditions of such issu-
ance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and
conditions.., by any governmental authority expressly authorized by law to grant such
approval." Id. § 77c(a)(10). The wording of section 1707.04 appears to bring it
clearly within the scope of section 3(a)(10) of the federal act. Noteworthy in section
1707.04 is the variety of transactions which may be subject to it- mergers and consoli-
dations; exchanges of securities of the issuer for securities of another issuer (pre-
sumably including voluntary exchange offers); and acquisitions of assets in exchange
for securities and the distribution of the securities received by the seller.
THE OHIO ACT
[TIhe bill's provisions [should] be codified as a series of sec-
tions at the end of Chapter 1707.24
The principal advantage apparently seen by. the legislation's
draftsmen of incorporating the Act into the structure of the Securi-
ties Law was that transactions violative of it would become subject
to the same liability and penalty provisions which apply to other
violations involving securities, as well as the procedural means af-
forded for securing relief, e.g., section 1707.23 (enforcement
powers of the Division),25 section 1707.24 (contempt proceedings), 6
section 1707.26 (injunctions against violations) ,27 and section
1707.99 (criminal penalties) .28 To assure that the old shoes fit the
new feet, the Act specifically provides: "An offeror is subject to
liabilities and penalties applicable to a seller and an offeree is en-
titled to remedies applicable to a purchaser, as set forth in sections
1707.41 to 1707.44, inclusive, of the Revised Code." 29 However, as
discussed later, there is some question as to how effective this graft-
ing effort may prove to be.
In brief, the legislation embodies the following provisions:
(1) A "takeover bid" may not be made until certain informa-
tion has been filed with the Division and the target company, and
the Division has determined, either on its own motion or at the
behest of the target company, either that a hearing with respect to
disclosures proposed to be made to offerees is unnecessary or, after
hearing, that such disclosures satisfy the statutory criteria.
(2) The "offeror" must comply with certain substantive require-
ments similar to those contained in the Williams Bill,o including
pro rata acceptance of securities tendered during the first 10 days,
and payment of increased consideration to all who tender.
(3) Any person owning 5 percent or more of any class of
equity securities of the target company may not make a takeover
bid if during the 1-year period preceding its proposed commence-
ment he purchased any such securities of the target company with-
out disclosing before such purchase either publicly or to the seller
that he intended to gain control of the target company.
2 4 Letter from Legislative Service Commission to Rep. Barry Levey, May 20, 1969.
2 5 CODE § 1707.23 (Page 1964).
261d. § 1707.24.
27 Id. § 1707.26.
28 Id. § 1707.99.
29 Id. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1969).
SO Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (Supp. IV,
1969) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
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In addition to these provisions, the contents of the disclosures
to the target company and the Division are set forth with consider-
able particularity. The Act contains definitions of various terms
used therein, exemptions from the application of its provisions, and
certain miscellaneous provisions.
Although the Act is inserted into the Ohio Securities Law as
a part thereof, in all respects, except for provisions with respect to
the necessity that takeover bids be made through licensed dealers
and except for the effort, perhaps abortive, at least in part, to make
applicable to takeover bids the liability and penal provisions of
the Securities Law, the bill is a comprehensive, self-sufficient and
independent enactment which might have been adopted as a sepa-
rate piece of legislation without relationship to the Ohio Securities
Law.
II. DEFINITIONS
A. Takeover Bid
For the most part the definitions contained in the Act are pre-
dictable. The first definition, and probably the most important,
is that of takeover bid.3' This term, while perhaps possessed of
some emotional content, nonetheless has derived respectability
from the fact that it is the customary term in England describing an
offer made to the shareholders of a company sought to be acquired32
and is, furthermore, incorporated in the Virginia and Nevada stat-
utes relating to tender offers. 3 Takeover bid is defined as:
[a] the acquisition of or an offer to acquire
[b] pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders
[c] any equity security
[d] of a corporation
[i] organized under the laws of Ohio or
[ii] having its principal place of business and substantial
assets within the State of Ohio and
[e] if after the acquisition the offeror [a defined term] would
be, directly or indirectly, the record or beneficial owner of
more than 10 percent of any class of the issued and outstand-
ing securities of the subject corporation.34
As in the Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act
3 1 CODE § 1707.041(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1969).
82 See The City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers, discussed in Sullivan, Registra-
tion of Take-Over Bids: A British Approach, 24 Bus. LAw. 1275 (1969).
33 Ch. 97, §§ 2-20, [1969] Nev. Acts 120-25; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -540
(Supp. 1968).
3 4 CODE § 1707.041(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1969).
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of 1934, the words "tender offer" and "tender" are not defined.
The SEC has ruled that "special bids" on an exchange are subject
to the provisions of Exchange Act sections 13(d) and 14(d); for
all practical purposes this has eliminated "special bids" as a means
of acquiring substantial amounts of stock. 5
The failure to define these terms, of course, leaves many ques-
tions unanswered. It would appear, although without express
indication, that a simple accumulation of, or an order to a broker to
accumulate, more than 10 percent of a class of outstanding equity
securities of an issuer would not constitute a tender offer, although
it is to be expected that target companies would make this con-
tention. In an unusual complaint filed by Lee National Corp.
against the directors of Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc.,"8 the
plaintiff charged that defendant target company, having alleged
that the stock purchase program of Lee (apparently not a tender
offer in the conventional sense) was a tender offer, should file
a Schedule 14D as required by Exchange Act section 14(d), which
requires that such a schedule be filed by anyone soliciting in op-
position to a tender offer.3" The complaint, of course, does not
constitute a determination that purchasing in the market is a tender
offer.
It is clear that the term tender offer in the Ohio Act applies
equally to cash tender offers and exchange offers; as indicated
earlier, the previously existing provisions of the Ohio Securities Law
had and continue to have applicability to exchange offers and, by
interpretation of the Division, to a limited extent to cash tender
offers. The Williams Act, which, of course, would apply concur-
rently with the Ohio Act in appropriate circumstances (as would
the blue sky laws of other states in which an offer is made), ex-
pressly excludes from section 13(d) and 14(d) offers made pursu-
ant to a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933,38
but section 14(e) prohibiting fraud-like conduct in connection with
tender offers is not so limited3 This limitation of the Williams
Act has been criticized since it in effect frees the company whose
85 Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection With Cash Take-Over Bids: The
New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAw. 19,28 (1969).3GLee Naei Corp. v. Hawkins, Civil No. 3823 (D.C. Del., filed Dec. 10, 1969),
reported in 30 SEc. REG. & L REP. A-8 (1969).
37 Exchange Act § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
38 Id. § 13d(5)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(5)(A); id. § 14(d)(8)(A), 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d)(8)(A).
89 Id. § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
1970]
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securities are sought in a registered exchange offer from the neces-
sity of filing communications with the SEC, a freedom not available
in the case of a cash tender offer or in a proxy contest.
The statute is specific in limiting its applicability to efforts
to acquire the equity securities of corporations; it would not appear
to apply to participations in real estate investment trusts, which
are not corporations in the conventional sense, or in limited part-
nerships. The latter exclusion has increased significance, of course,
as an increasing number of economic endeavors, e.g., oil and gas
participations, are cast in limited partnership form.
The provision defining takeover bid in terms of "direct or in-
direct" ownership of more than 10 percent of any class of the is-
sued and outstanding equity securities of the target company sug-
gests that, in determining whether the requisite degree of ownership
has been or will have been achieved, securities of the class issuable
upon conversion of other securities or exercise of warrants must be
taken into account. Also, of course, any ownership, even if only
beneficial and bereft of voting power, must be taken into account40
Further, in view of the statute's definition of "equity security," 41
it would appear that acquisition, or proposed acquisition, by tender
offer, of more than 10 percent of a class of outstanding convert-
ible debentures, convertible preferred stock, or warrants might be
construed as a takeover bid. All of these are included in the defini-
tion of equity security and would presumably be regarded as sepa-
rate classes.
The question has been raised whether the definition of takeover
bid might be construed to include solicitations by a corporation
of tenders from its own securityholders. While it would appear
that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the overall
structure of the Act (if the issuer is the offeror, who is the target
company?), and its purpose, nonetheless, it cannot be said with
certainty that a court might not, given facts suggesting some abuse
by management, so construe it. The SEC was, under the Williams
Act, given explicitly broad power to regulate the repurchase of its
own shares by a corporation; 42 rules issued so far have been limited
to requiring disclosure by corporations purchasing shares during
4 0 CODE § 1707.041(A) (1) (Page Supp. 1969).
41 See text accompanying notes 78-79 iWfra.
42 Exchange Act § 13(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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the period when another offeror is conducting a tender offer for
its shares.43
The wording of this definition of takeover bid would indicate
that if a corporation had acquired, say, more than 10 percent of a
class of convertible debentures in the market and then made a
tender offer for, say, 2 percent of the common, the tender offer
would be a takeover bid, since literally, after the acquisition of the
common stock, it would be the owner of "more than 10 percent of
any class of the issued and outstanding equity securities of such
corporation." 44  In other words, the operative event is not a bid
which will result in owning 10 percent of the class which is the
subject of the bid; the operative combination which constitutes a
takeover bid is the expectation of ownership "'of more than 10
percent of any class" of equity securities after a bid for a class of
equity security.
The most significant, and undoubtedly the most controversial,
aspect of the definition is the inclusion in takeover bid of tender
offers directed towards the securities of a corporation "organized
under the laws of this State or having its principal place of busi-
ness and substantial assets within this state .... .- This provi-
sion, of course, poses intriguing questions. For instance: (1)
Given the traditional doctrine that the state of incorporation may,
to the exclusion of other states, regulate the internal affairs of
a corporation,4 6 is the regulation of a tender offer a matter of
"internal affairs," thereby conferring upon the state of incorpora-
tion exclusive jurisdiction over such matters, regardless of the
contacts of other jurisdictions, i.e., location of properties and of-
fices, location of quantities of shareholders? (2) Are there other
contacts superior to "principal place of business and substantial as-
sets" which would justify regulation by a jurisdiction other than
Ohio, perhaps to the exclusion of regulation by Ohio , *
Obviously this definition is studded with constitutional issues;
these are discussed elsewhere. It may be noteworthy that section
1707.04 of the Ohio Securities Law pertaining to the issuance of
securities in reorganizations limits its applicability to a corpora-
tion "organized under the laws of this state, or having its prind-
4 3 8EC Rule 13e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH MED. SEC
L. REP. 5 26,852, at 20,107-3.
4 4 CODE § 1707.041 (A) (1) (Page Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
45Jd. (emphasis added).
4 8 See R- HENN, CORPORATiONS 99 (1961).
47 Loss & COwE=T, supra note 10, at 180.
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pal place of business within this state";4" there is in this provision
no mention of "substantial assets" within the state. It may be that
the drafters of the Act felt that to shore up the constitutionality
of the provision it would be better to extend the necessary contacts
in Ohio of a target company not incorporated in Ohio, thereby in-
creasing the chances of a successful defense to charges that Ohio's
interests in a tender offer directed to shareholders of a non-Ohio
corporation were not sufficient to satisfy constitutional require-
ments. The jurisdictional requirement of a very early draft49 (never
submitted to the legislature) referred to tender offers for any class
of equity security of "any corporation incorporated under the laws
of this state, doing business in this state and having more than ---
registered holders of such class of equity security in this state"
(draft did not include a number). Obviously the requirement
that there be a significant number of shareholders in the state
would shore up considerably Ohio's claim of jurisdiction.
The Act specifically excludes from the definition of take-
over bid certain activities:
(1) "Bids made by a dealer for his own account in the ordinary
course of his business of buying and selling such security" are ex-
cluded.5 This provision, seemingly innocuous, poses certain signifi-
cant problems. Obviously a dealer bidding for a security in the
ordinary course of business of buying and selling such security is not
going to do it in the manner in which a tender offer is typically con-
ducted - by advertising, direct solicitations of holders, and so on.
Hence, if this exemption is to be construed as having significance,
then it would appear that without it the definition of takeover bid
might apply to the conduct of a dealer accumulating a position by
purchases in the market. As a consequence of the specific delinea-
tion of this conduct by a dealer as not included in takeover bid, is
similar conduct by any other person, such as placing a bid with a
dealer for execution in the market with the purpose of accumu-
lating more that 10 percent of a class of equity securities, to be
construed as encompassed within the term takeover bid? Obviously
48 CODE § 1707.04 (Page 1964).
49 See note 22 supra.
0 CODB § 1707.041(A) (1) (a) (Page Supp. 1969). A minor anomaly of this section
derives from the fact that "dealer" under section 1707.01(E)(1) is defined as meaning
"every person . . .who engages or professes to engage, in this state, for either all or
part of his time, directly or indirectly, in the business of the sale of securities" [id. §
1707.01(E) (1) (Page 1964) (emphasis added)]; no mention is made in this defini-
tion of one who buys securities.
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such an interpretation would extend the scope of this enactment
considerably beyond what is generally conceived to be its limits.
(2) An exchange offer - securities for securities - that is
sufficiently limited in number and nature of offerees that the
transactions would be exempt from registration under the Securities
Act of 1933 because of the operation of section 4(2) of that Act,
the so-called "private offering exemption," is also excluded from
the scope of takeover bid."1 To be entitled to the exclusion from
the definition, the offers and purchases must be made for the sole
account of the offeror, they must be made in good faith, they must
not be for the purpose of avoiding the Ohio takeover legislation and
only securities may be offered - there may not be a consideration
of cash and securities. Inasmuch as this exemption is structured
in terms of an exemption from the definition of the term takeover
bid, it appears that any such proposed exchange offer would, in all
probability, regardless of this provision, be required to be regis-
tered under the Ohio Securities Law since that law has no equiva-
lent of the private offering exemption. The Division would
then be authorized under section 1707.09 (registration by qualifi-
cation, which would probably be the necessary course) "as a pre-
requisite to qualification" to "make an examination of the issuer
of securities sought to be qualified;" to determine whether such
offer would be on "grossly unfair terms"; whether "the business
of the issuer is ... fraudulently conducted"; whether "the plan of
issuance and sale .. .would defraud or deceive, or tend to de-
fraud or deceive"; and whether the proposed offer otherwise
conforms with the Act's requirements.52 Thus, even if compliance
with the Act was not required because the number of offerees,
their "ability to fend for themselves" and access to information
which would ordinarily be in a registration statement were sufficient
to satisfy the private offering exemption of the Securities- Act,53
nonetheless, the Division could hinder considerably the proposed ex-
change offer by simply ordering an investigation pursuant to its pow-
ers under section 1707.09; this it could, of course, do before enact-
ment of the Act.
It would appear from the language of the Act that an offer
might be made lawfully to less than all the shareholders of a corn-
511d. § 1707.041(A)(1)(b) (Page Supp. 1969).
52 Id. § 1707.09 (Page 1964).
53 Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964). See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,
346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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pany to keep the offer within the private offering exemption.51
Thus, if a company had a large number of shareholders, but a rela-
tively small number of them held sufficient securities to deliver
effective control to an offeror, the offeror might solicit the ten-
ders of the limited number and ignore the remainder of the share-
holders. Thus, it would appear that this provision countenances
what appears to be still the common law rule, that, absent fraud
or other improper conduct, an offer may be made to those in con-
trol of a corporation without a corresponding offer being made to
other shareholders. 55 Despite the strong misgivings of law re-
view authors concerning this conduct,5" neither state corporation
law57 nor section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-55"
promulgated thereunder require that the same offer be made to
all shareholders as is made to controlling shareholders. Thus, con-
duct which in the eyes of many writers is regarded as unfair and
unconscionable, would appear to be sanctioned, even encouraged,
by this express exemption from the definition of takeover bid.
Presumably the requirement that the transaction be in "good
faith" is intended to inhibit an offer of a redeemable security
which is closely followed by a redemption, thereby changing an
exchange offer into a cash tender offer; however, as noted below,
a cash tender offer might be made to a larger number of offerees
than an exchange offer. It would not seem to be "bad faith" to
limit the offer to less than all shareholders of the target company.
The question might be raised whether such conduct was "for the
purpose of avoiding this section," but it would appear that an ef-
fective argument could be made that rather than seeking to avoid
the section, such an offer was in strict compliance with it.
Despite the exemption of this kind of transaction from the
scope of takeover bid, nonetheless, it would appear that unless
an exchange offer could be registered by a description under sec-
tion 1707.0659 (an unlikely possibility given the typical character-
istics of exchange offers), or unless an exemption were available
"CODE § 1707.041(A)(1)(b) (Page Supp. 1969).
5 5 See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
5 See, e.g., Andrews, The Stockholders' Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Shares, 78 HARV. L REV. 505 (1965).
57 See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
5 8 Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964); SEC Exchange Act Rule 10b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 26,744, at
20,061-3. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952); Cristo-
phides v. Proco, 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
59 CODE § 1707.06 (Page 1964).
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(e.g., the security offered was listed on an exchange),60 the offeror
would be required to qualify as a dealer and secure a dealer's li-
cense unless the offer was made through a licensed dealer. It
should be noted that in any instance in which a dealer's license is
required, it is necessary that at least one principal of the dealer take
an examination, even though the nature of the license is "restricted"
and confined to a particular series of transactions."'
(3) Also excluded from the definition of takeover bid is
Iany other offer to acquire an equity security, or the acquisition of
such equity security pursuant to such offer, for the sole account
of the offeror, from not more than fifty persons, in good faith
and not for the purpose of avoiding this section. 62 This subsec-
tion appears to be confined to cash and cash plus securities tender
offers. Unlike the vagaries of the numbers of those to whom
an offering may be made and still enjoy the benefits of the private
offering exemption under the Securities Act, this subsection has
the merit of certainty; however, it leaves uncertain whether more
than one individual may be aggregated to constitute an offeree.63
Since 25 offerees is considered something of a benchmark for a
private offering under federal law," it would appear that a cash
offer might be more safely made to a larger number than an ex-
change offer. The subsection, however, does not require that the
same offer be made to all shareholders of the target company; in-
stead the offeror might approach the 50 largest shareholders of a
corporation and offer to purchase their securities, which purchases
might well afford it control. It appears this subsection also ap-
plies to combined cash and securities exchange offers; thus, the
offering might not be entitled to the private offering exemption for
federal purposes but would be entitled to this exemption.
(4) The most questionable exemption from the scope of take-
over bids is the one that exempts a tender offer or invitation
for tenders to which the target company consents by action of its
601 d. § 1707.02(E)(1).
61 d. § 1707.15 (G).
62 Id. § 1707.041(A)(1)(c) (Page Supp. 1969).
6 3 In some contexts, more than one individual constitutes a "person." E.g., SEC Se-
curities Act Rule 154, 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1969), reprinted in 1 CCH FED. SEC. L
REP. S 5725, at 5062. See Securities Act Release No. 4669 (Feb. 26, 1964), in 1
CCEI FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 2920, at 2709. Under the "Wheat Proposals;' contained in
Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969), reprinted in CCH Special Report No.
272 (Extra Edition Sept. 6, 1969), the identity of those to be aggregated is specified
with unusual exactitude (proposed Rule 162 (b)).
64 See Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935), in 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
9 2740, at 26 76; H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954).
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board of directors, provided the board recommends acceptance and
the terms of the offer, "including any inducements to officers or
directors which are not made available to all shareholders," are
furnished to shareholders.6 5 In commenting on the original pro-
vision which would have given the Division discretion to exempt a
proposed takeover bid when the target company by action of its
board of directors consented to the offeror's proposal and recom-
mended that its shareholders accept it, Ronald J. Coffey, Associate
Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University, stated in a
memorandum addressed to the sponsors of the bill:
Although under Subsection (F), the Division of Securities is
not compelled to exempt a take-over bid which is approved and
recommended by the management of a target company, there is at
least a statutory indication that approval by management somehow
carries with it a reduction of the need for adequate disclosure to the
shareholders of the target company. One wonders why. This ex-
emptive provision raises what can amount to a statutory authoriza-
tion or a sanction of conflict of interest situations. If management
of the target company strikes a deal with the offeror, then the
chances of an exemption are enhanced, even though such circum-
stances may create even greater reason for disclosure to the target
company shareholders. 66
The provision as finally amended makes the exemption abso-
lute and not subject to the Division's discretion, but it provides
that there must be disclosure of any inducements made to man-
agement. Despite these modifications, recommendation by the
board of directors of a target company avoids the necessity of sub-
mitting to the target company and the Division all of the exten-
sive information required under subsection (B) (3) of the Act67 and
avoids all necessity for an offeror to satisfy the Division that its
proposed disclosures to shareholders of the target company are
"fair, full, and effective." The exemption appears to be based
on the assumption that where the board of directors of the target
company has approved the offer the only information material to
a shareholder is whether management has been offered some in-
ducement, a peculiar reduction in the otherwise required scope of
disclosure. Since this is an absolute exclusion from the scope of
takeover bids, in the case of cash tender offers the Division has no
other authority to regulate the scope of disclosures; in the case
of exchange offers, it has only the power to make certain deter-
65 CODE § 1707.041(A)(1)(d) (Page Supp. 1969).
66 Memorandum accompanying letter to Hon. William W. Taft dated Apr. 3, 1969.
6 TCODE § 1707.041(B) (3) (h) (Page Supp. 1969).
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minations under which it could conceivably require some disclos-
ure."s However, in the face of the fairly explicit legislative as-
sertion that disclosure of anything other than inducements is
unnecessary when a tender offer has the approval of the board of
directors of the target company, it is unlikely that the Division
would impose any such requirements.
It is not enough to qualify for this exemption that the board
of directors "consent" to the offer; they must "recommend ac-
ceptance." In many instances the directors may be quite willing
to submit the offer to shareholders, but unwilling to express an
opinion with respect to its acceptability. In this case, presum-
ably the tender offer becomes a takeover bid and subject to the
other provisions of the statute.
A recent Illinois case has implied that directors have a fiduciary
responsibility in the face of a tender offer to state whether they
recommend such offer to the shareholders or not,69 and the sug-
gestion has been made that the SEC adopt such a requirement pur-
suant to its rulemaking power under the provisions of the Wil-
liams Act.70 There is no such affirmative obligation on directors
under this statute, and apparently none under Ohio case law.
B. Offeror
The term "offeror" is defined as "a person who makes, or in
any way participates or aids in making a take-over bid, and includes
persons acting jointly or in concert or who intend to exercise
jointly or in concert any voting rights attached to the securities
for which such take-over bid is made."71  A defender of the Act
has stated that this language is intended to embrace the officers,
directors, and perhaps shareholders of the offeror company,7" but
it appears that the language may be construed to embrace others
besides them, including those who participate or aid in making the
bids. For instance, what of newspapers which carry advertise-
ments in connection with the tender offer; have they an obligation
to see to it that the necessary filings are made and that the determi-
68 Id. § 1707.09(D) (Page 1964), gives the Division the power to determine, in-
ter alia, whether the offering is on grossly unfair terms.
69 Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. I1. 1969).
7o See PLI CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE TRANSCRIPT, TExAs GULF SULPHUR
- INSIDER DIscLOSuRB PROBLEMS 462 (Series No. 1, 1968) (A. Fleischer & J. Flom
eds. 1968) (comments of W. McNeil Kennedy).
7 1 CODE § 1707.041(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1969).
72 Vorys, supra note 11, at 69.
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nations required before an offer is made have been made by the
Division, and may they be held liable for misconduct of the princi-
pal offeror? Similarly, what of brokers who simply transmit the
offer to beneficial owners of securities held in their name; what are
the limitations of their liability? This provision is apparently in-
tended to extend the embrace of the law in a manner somewhat
similar to section 13(d)(2) of the Exchange Act which states
that "[wjhen any two or more persons act as a partnership,
limited partnership, syndicate or other group for the purpose of ac-
quiring, holding or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndi-
cate or group shall be deemed a 'person' for the purpose of this
subsection. ' 73
C. Offeree
"Offeree" is defined as "the beneficial or record owner of
securities which an offeror acquires or offers to acquire in con-
nection with a take-over bid.' 7  Presumably, because of the inclu-
sion of both beneficial and record owners within the term offeree,
in the event of a hearing before the Division it would be neces-
sary for the offeror to demonstrate the manner in which it pro-
posed to make disclosure to beneficial owners since the Act re-
quires an adjudiciation by the Division that "the offeror proposes
to make fair, full, and effective disclosure to offerees."75  Pre-
sumably an expression of intent to furnish to record owners solici-
tation materials, together with reimbursement for the expenses of
forwarding them to beneficial owners, would suffice.7 6
D. Target Company
"Target company" is defined as "a corporation whose securities
are or are to be the subject of a take-over bid. '77  Use of this
term is unusual and would lead one to believe that it was chosen
less for its descriptive merits than for its emotional overtones.
Nonetheless the definition is simple and straightforward, except for
the failure to qualify the word "securities" with the word "equity,"
which would be consistent with the remainder of the statute.
73 Exchange Act § 14(d) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
74 CODE § 1707.041(A) (3) (Page Supp. 1969).
75 Id. § 1707.041 (B) (1) (c) (emphasis added).
76 N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 451, reprinted in 2 CCH N.Y. STocK ExcIL Guinn 3
2451, at 3805.
7 7 CoDE § 1707.041 (A) (4) (Page Supp. 1969).
THE OHIO ACT
E. Equity Security
"Equity security" is defined in the broadest possible terms and
includes "any shares or similar securities, or any securities convert-
ible into such shares or similar securities or carrying any warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase such securities, or any such war-
rant or right, or any other security which, for the protection of se-
curity holders, is treated as an equity security pursuant to regula-
tions of the Division of Securities. '7 8  The Legislative Service Com-
mission remarked:
[This definition] appears too broad for its purpose. A reading of
the bill leads to the conclusion that the only securities relevant to
its purpose are those carrying rights through which effective con-
trol of a corporation might be gained. The bill, however, defines
equity security to include, literally any security. "Security" can
mean a mortgage, bond, debentures, non-voting preferred stock,
and any other debt or equity paper, as well as voting stock. Since
the definition of equity security thus embraces many types of se-
curities which could not be used to gain control, it might be well
to tighten it up so as to include only securities which can be used
for this purpose and are therefore relevant to the bill.79
This comment would appear to be well-founded. The breadth
of definition of equity security results in a number of anomalies.
For instance, there is a takeover bid if after the acquisition by tender
offer is completed the offeror would be the record or beneficial
owner of more than 10 percent of any class of the issued and out-
standing equity securities of the target company. However, as will
be discussed below, the offeror is disqualified from making a take-
over bid for a period of time if he owns 5 percent or more of the
issued and outstanding equity securities of any class of the target
company and did not disclose at the time of acquisition his intent
to acquire control. Thus, an offeror who acquired 5 percent of a
small class of warrants outstanding might be precluded from making
a tender offer addressed to the common shares of the company,
even though his ownership of the warrants afforded him negli-
gible progress toward control. Similarly, limited ownership of pre-
ferred stock of a corporation would breed the same result.
III. PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS
The statute describes in considerable detail, but with some
puzzling hiatuses, the procedure which must be followed by an of-
781d. § 1707.041(A)(5).
7 9 Legislative Service Commission, supra note 24.
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feror in making a takeover bid. It provides that the takeover bid
may not be made unless the offeror at least 20 days prior to the
commencement of it announces publicly the terms of the proposed
bid and files with the Division and the target company information
specified in the statute; 0 during this period no solicitation activities
may be engaged in. The bid may be commenced 20 days after the
announcement and filing only if one of three events occurs:
(A) Within ten days following such filing no hearing is or-
dered by the Division or requested by the target company;(B) A hearing is requested by the target company within such
time but the Division finds that no cause for a hearing exists;
(C) A hearing is ordered within such time and upon such
hearing the Division adjudicates that the offeror proposes to make
fair, full, and effective disclosure to offerees of all information
material to a decision to accept or reject the offer.8 '
If a hearing is ordered it must be held within 40 days after
the date the offeror filed the required information with the Divi-
sion and with the target company (that is, within 20 clays after the
offer would otherwise have begun); the adjudication by the Divi-
sion must be made within 60 days after the filing (20 days or more
after commencement of the hearing), and it must be held pursuant
to Code sections 119.01 to 119.1382 (the Administrative Procedure
Act). The target company is required to pay the Division $250
upon application for a hearing and must deposit a sum not exceed-
ing $750 to defray the cost of the hearing and any investigation
which the Division may make in connection with the application.8
If the Division finds that the proposed offer violates section
1707 or that effective provision has not been made for full and
fair disclosure to the offerees of material information, it shall so
adjudicate; if it finds that the offer would comply with the Act
if amended in certain respects, it shall so adjudicate; and, if it finds
that the takeover bid does not violate section 1707 and that ef-
fective provision is made for fair and full disclosure to offerees
of all information material to their decision to accept or reject
the bid, it shall so adjudicate.8" This procedure is replete with
incongruities, inconsistencies, and unanswered questions.
First, it requires a public announcement of the terms of the
80 CoDE §1707.041(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1969).
81 Id.
821d. §§ 119.01-.13 (Page 1969).
83 1d. § 1707.041(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1969).
841d.
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proposed takeover bid, but does not tell what would constitute an
adequate public announcement. Would this require ads in the
/all Street Journal, the New York Times, and/or the principal
papers in Ohio? The Division has adopted Form 041 ("Form for
the Filing of Information Pertaining to a Take-over Bid Pursuant
to Section 1707.041 of the Revised Code of Ohio"), which requires
that "publication shall be made in a newspaper of general circula-
tion in Franklin County, Ohio" (the county in which Columbus,
the capitol, is located). It does not appear that this requirement,
which has all the earmarks of a rule, was adopted by any formal
procedure. What is the purpose of a public announcement?
Would it not be sufficient to provide that the proposed terms sim-
ply be transmitted to the shareholders of the target company and
correlatively that the target company be obliged to furnish a
shareholders list to the offeror or alternatively transmit the terms
to its shareholders?
An offeror making an exchange offer would, of course, have to
be wary lest his compliance with the Ohio legislation entailed viola-
tion of the federal securities laws, as well as other state blue sky
laws. Under that Act it is unlawful to make an offer of a security
prior to the filing of a registration statement, and after the filing
only specified writings may be circulated.,5 The SEC and the courts
have been vigilant in construing this requirement broadly.86 The
SEC has adopted Rule 135 under the Act which permits, in the case
of exchange offers, limited communications with the holders of se-
curities for which an offer is made. A communication within 'the
rule may state "the name of the issuer and the title of the securities
to be surrendered in exchange for the securities to be offered,, the
basis upon which the exchange is proposed to be made and the
period during which the exchange may be made."' 7
While Rule 135 would appear to be broad enough to permit a
statement of the terms of the takeover bid, there may be some
question concerning the breadth of the disclosure. The Rule con-
templates disclosure to the holders of the securities sought, while
the Ohio Act contemplates a "public" announcement. Presumably
85 SecuritiesAct §§ 5(b) (1), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(b) (1), (c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
86 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L REP. 5 92,648, at 98,888 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 1970) (en banc); SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEC L REP. 9 3250, at
3108.
87 SEC Rule 135, 17 CF.R. § 230.135 (1969), -reprinted in 1 CCH FEiD. SEC. L.
REP. 9 3012, at 3053.
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the SEC would take a pragmatic view of this and permit a dis-
closure identified as directed to the target company's share-
holders which was accomplished through broader publication, as,
for instance, in a newspaper.
The New York Stock Exchange, consistent with its position
before Congress at the time the Williams Act was under consid-
ation,8  has criticized the requirement for such advance notification
because of the disruptive effect it would have upon markets. In
connection with this provision it stated in its comments to the Ohio
House of Representatives:
While this would provide an extended period during which the
Division could review the offer and entertain protests by the target
company management, it would also create difficult conditions in
the market for the target company's stock. During the 20-day
period there could be rumors, counter-offers and rumors of
counter-offers which may result in price fluctuations to the extent
that the market in the stock would be disrupted. This may make
it necessary for the Exchange to temporarily halt trading in the
stock. In some cases trading may be halted for the duration of the
20-day period. The impact of the Ohio law would thereby be felt
by investors throughout the Nation who would be deprived of a
market for the securities they hold in the Ohio company.89
The Exchange underestimates the peril this legislation poses for
markets. It is not a period of 20 days during which uncertainties
may stir the market. If a hearing is ordered, that 20-day period
would in all probability extend to 60 days, the time within which
the Division is supposed to make its adjudication, and in all prob-
ability long beyond that as a consequence of appeals, motions for
rehearing, and the like.
Although these procedural requirements establish standards
(inconsistent to some extent as will be seen below) for determina-
tion as to whether the tender offer will be permitted, no such
standards are provided for determining whether, when a target
company has made an application for a hearing, cause for a hearing
exists. Is the standard to be comparable to that justifying a pre-
liminary injunction - a probability that on final determination
it would be determined that fair, full, and effective disclosure is
not proposed to be made by the offeror? Although in other
respects time limits for action are set forth with particularity,
there is no limitation on the time by which the Division must
88 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1967, § F, at 16, col. 3.
89 Statement by the New York Stock Exchange on Amend. Sub. S.B. No. 138, File
No. 90 (Reg. Sess. 1969-70), May 9, 1969.
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make its determination that no cause for hearing exists, although
an order for a hearing must be made in writing 10 days following
the filing" and the hearing would have to commence within the 40-
day period specified."1
If a hearing is ordered, it is clear that this order must be made
"within such time"92 which apparently refers back to 10 days fol-
lowing the filing by the offeror.93 While this provision has the
merit of certainty, nonetheless its relationship to the other provi-
sions concerning the ordering of a hearing is unusual. The order
for a hearing may be made either by the Division on its own mo-
tion or at the request of the target company. The target company
has 10 days from the time of filing within which to make its request
and the Division has 10 days from the date Pf filing within which
to order a hearing.' What, one may ask, results if at the last mo-
ment of the lath day after filing the target company requests a
hearing: must the Division instantly make its determination whether
there shall be a hearing? If it does not, can the Division thereafter
order a hearing?
The statute is silent with respect to the status of an order by
the Division for a hearing; for instance, is it an appealable order 795
Further, may the Division in connection with making this determi-
nation conduct an investigation and subpoena witnesses, and if so,
what other procedural provisions are applicable? Examination of
the Ohio Securities Law describing the Division's powers in these
particulars leaves a question mark 6
Subsection 1707.041(B)(1) provides that an offer may com-
mence if the offeror has publicy announced the terms of the pro-
posed takeover bid, has filed with the Division and the target com-
pany copies of the required information, a hearing either has not
been ordered, or has been ordered within 10 days after filing and
the Division has adjudicated that the offeror proposes to make fair
9 0 CODE § 1707.041(B)(1)(b) (Page Supp. 1969).
911d. § 1707.041(B)(4).
921d. § 1707.041(B)(1)(c).
931d. § 1707.041(B)(1)(a).
94 Id.
95 Bearing on this question is whether such an order is an "adjudication" as de-
fined in Code section 119.01 (D). If it is, then a number of procedural consequences
follow under the Administrative Procedure Act (sections 119.01-.13), including appli-
cability (section 119.12).
96 The Division's powers are detailed in Code sections 1707.23-.27. Certain of
the powers described therein might be used in connection with a determination of
whether cause for a hearing exists, but given the short time within which the ded-
sion must be made, as a practical matter, many of them may be useless.
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and full disclosure to the offerees of all information material to a
decision to accept or reject the offer. 7 It is not a condition that
the Division shall have adjudicated that the offer is, in the case of
an exchange offer, not, for instance, "on grossly unfair terms" or
that the offer complies in any other way with the provisions of the
Act or with chapter 1707 as a whole. However, subsection
1707.041 (B) (4) provides for a different adjudication, namely, that
the takeover bid is in violation of chapter 1707 of the Code or that
effective provision is not made for fair and full disclosure to of-
ferees of all information material to a decision to accept or reject
the offer.98 Thus the anomaly: suppose the Division adjudicates
that the takeover bid is in violation of chapter 1707 in other re-
spects (e.g., on grossly unfair terms) but that effective provision is
made for fair and full disclosure to offerees? In such a situation
subsection 1707.041 (B) (1) creates the impression that, assuming
the necessary filings have occurred, the only remaining necessary
condition to commencement of the bid has occurred, namely, a hear-
ing at which the Division adjudicates that the offeror proposes to
make fair, full, and effective disclosure. In practice undoubtedly
the adjudication by the Division would be sufficiently broad to
avoid this contradiction, but nonetheless it is buried in the statute.
Subsection 1707.041 (B) (4) also provides that the Division
may find that the takeover bid would comply with the section if
amended in certain respects, and that it may so adjudicate.9 Since
this subsection empowers the Division to adjudicate not only that
effective provision is not made for fair and full disclosure, but also
that the takeover bid is in violation of chapter 1707, it would ap-
pear clearly implied that the amendments upon which approval
might be conditioned could be of various sorts. It might be re-
quired that the proposed disclosures to offerees be amended, or
that the terms of the bid be changed since the terms, if "grossly
unfair," might in the case of an exchange offer constitute a viola-
tion of chapter 1707.100
No provision is made for resolving problems that may be posed
if there is an adjudication that the takeover bid would comply with
the section if amended in certain respects. Is it required that, if the
terms of the bid must be amended, the amended terms be publicly
9 7 CODE § 1707.041(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1969).
98id. § 1707.041(B)(4).
991d.
10O Id. § 1707.13 (Page 1964).
THE OHIO ACT
disclosed, that amended filings be made with the Division and that
20 days expire before commencement of the offer? Or is it in-
tended that immediately upon amendment the offer may commence?
If the amendment is in the terms, and if, as it appears, the legisla-
ture felt it desirable that publicity be given to the original terms 20
days in advance of the offer, may it not be argued that a similar
period of publicity should be given to amendments to the terms?
Finally, subsection 1707.041(C) of the Act provides that Code
section 1707.14, requiring that only licensed dealers engage in the
business of buying and selling securities, must be complied with.
Hence, either the person seeking the securities must become a li-
censed dealer, or the services of an Ohio-licensed dealer must be pro-
cured. This provision, of course, provides a large measure of control
over the manner in which the offer can be carried out, since the Di-
vision has broad control over the conduct of dealers.
IV. INFORMATION TO BE FILED
The statute details the information which must be filed with
the Division and the target company 20 days in advance of the
proposed commencement of the offering. Virtually all of the re-
quired information parallels information required by either the
Williams Act (Schedule 13D) 101 or the Securities Act (Form
S-1). 102 The original proposal submitted to the legislature pro-
vided that there be filed with the Division and the target company
"copies of all information which such offeror intends to make pub-
lic or to transmit to offerees in connection with such take-over
bid," but it contained no other description of the information which
would have to be filed or disclosed to offerees 03  It was felt
by many that giving the Division the power to determine that the
proposed disclosures were not fair, full, and effective without
specifying the disclosures to be made or the standards to which
they would have to conform created the danger of serious abuse.
The Division could theoretically find that any disclosure, no matter
how comprehensive or extensive, in some particular or other failed
to comply with the fair, full, and effective standard. Thus, it
was proposed that the required disclosures be set forth specifically.
As a result of this there is an extensive delineation of the informa-
1o SEC Exchange Act Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969), reprinted in
2 CCH FED. SEC. L REP. a 26,853, at 20,107-4.
102 SEC Securities Act Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1969), reprinted in 1 CCH
FED. SEC. L REP. 5 7122, at 6201.
103 S.B. No. 138 (Reg. Sess. 1969-70) (Original Draft).
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tion which must be filed with the Division and the target company,
ending with the requirement that there also be filed "such other
and further documents, exhibits, data, and information as may be
required by regulation of the Division, or as may be necessary to
make fair, full, and effective disclosure to offerees of all informa-
tion material to a decision to accept or reject the offer."' 0 4 Thus,
the efforts of those seeking to limit the discretion of the Division
resulted in the creation of an explicit extensive pattern of dis-
closure, but with a continued vesting in the Division of the very
discretion their proposals attempted to avoid!
The following is a summary of the information required to be
filed.
(1) "Copies of all prospectuses, brochures, advertisements,
circulars, letters, or other matter by means of which the offeror
proposes to disclose to offerees all information material to a deci-
sion to accept or reject the offer."'0 5  If these documents must be
filed 20 days in advance of commencement of the takeover bid, may
any follow-up literature be used during the period of the offering
which was not submitted at the time of the original filing? As is
frequently the case in tender offers, the offeror desires to counter
the efforts of management to dissuade tendering by shareholders,
and obviously such literature to be responsive to the arguments
of management could only be prepared after commencement of
the tender offer. Does this section preclude use of such material?
It may be suggested that it does not, since the written material
to be submitted is that which discloses to offerees all information
material to a decision to accept or reject the offering. 0 6 Presum-
ably it is possible prior to the commencement of the offering to
make a determination of which information is material to a deci-
sion with subsequent mailings containing only rebuttal arguments
but no new information material to the offeree's decision. How-
ever, it can be argued to the contrary that as a consequence of
assertions made by management additional information may become
material which would not have been reasonably deemed to be ma-
terial prior to the publicity of management. Quite obviously if the
offeror is precluded from using any written material in connection
with his solicitation other than that which was submitted prior to
commencement of the tender offer, he will be gravely disadvan-
104 CODE § 1707.041(B)(3)(h) (Page Supp. 1969).
1051,. § 1707.041(B)(3)(a).
1061,. § 1707.041(B)(3)(h).
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taged vis-i-vis management, which will be able to counter his
solicitation with information and arguments not subject to review
by the Division under this or any other statute and not subject
to effective rebuttal by the offeror.10 7
(2) "The identity and background of all persons on whose
behalf the acquisition of any equity security of the target company
has been or is to be effected."' 08  Literally applied this would re-
quire information for an indefinite period concerning transactions
and people having nothing whatsoever to do with the takeover
bid; presumably in practice its application would be appropriately
limited. This requirement parallels Item 2 of Schedules 13D and
14D.10 9 It is possible that the persons on whose behalf the acquisi-
tion is to be made are not coextensive with "offeror" and obviously
great care would need to be exercised to insure the avoidance
of a material omission.
(3) "The source and amount of funds or other consideration
used or to be used in acquiring any equity security, including a
statement describing any securities, other than the existing capital
stock or long term debt of the offeror, which are being offered in
exchange for the equity securities of the target company."' 10 This
has its origin in Item 3 of Schedule 13D but significantly omits
the requirement in that schedule of information concerning the
source of borrowed funds, a provision which was objected to at the
time of adoption of the Williams Act on the grounds that it might
unfairly inhibit borrowing by offerors because it would expose the
target company's lenders to considerable pressure."' In view of
the manifest purpose of this legislation to protect target com-
10TIt should be noted that SEC Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1970), re-
printed it; 2 CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 26,887, at 20,152, requires that where a tender
offer is subject to Exchange Act § 14(d) [15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (Supp. IV, 1969)], the
target company may have to file a Schedule 14D. However, no pre-use clearance anal-
ogous to the Ohio Act is embodied in the federal procedure. Lack of target company
compliance would subject it to post-use SEC injunctive action under section 21 (e) of the
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964)], criminal penalties under section 32 [id. §
78ff], and possibly civil liability based upon the offeror's implied right of action under
section 32. This control over the targetes actions exists, however, only when the of-
fer is for cash and the target is a company which is required to register under section
12 of the Exchange Act. Id. §§ 78n(d)(1), (d)(8).
108 CODE § 1707.041 (B) (3) (b) (Page Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
1 9 SEC Exchange Act Schedule 13D, Item 2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969),
reprinted in 2 CCH FkD. SEC. L REP. 9 26,853, at 20,107-4; SEC Exchange Act Sched-
ule 14D, Item 2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L
REP. 5 24,031, at 17,578.
110 CODE § 1707.041 (B) (3) (c) (Page Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
111 Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares - A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967
DUKE LJ. 231; Manne, Salute to "Raiders", Barton's, Oct. 23, 1967, at 18.
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panies, it is surprising that it does not make provision to afford
them this information.
(4) "A statement of any plans or proposals which the offeror,
upon gaining control, may have to liquidate the target company,
sell its assets, effect a merger or consolidation of it, or make any
other change in its business, corporate structure, management per-
sonnel, or policies of employment.""12  This provision has its ori-
gins in Item 4 of Schedule 13D, but in several particulars it de-
parts from this item and exposes the parochial thrust of the Act.
The requirement assumes that the purpose of the takeover bid is
to acquire control, for it says that the offeror shall include in the
information filed "a statement of any plans or proposals which [are
contemplated byl the offeror upon gaining control.""' 3  It is unlike
the comparable disclosure provision in the Williams Act which
states "if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is
to acquire control of the business of the issuer of the securities.""' 4
The definition of takeover bid relates only to a tender offer which
if accomplished would give the offeror more than 10 percent of any
class of equity security of the target company;" 5 nowhere is mention
made of the intention to acquire control as a constituent element of
a takeover bid. While it is true that in the overwhelming number
of instances the purpose of a tender offer is to secure control, none-
theless this is not a foregone conclusion.
The most significant litigation under the Williams Act thus
far has focused upon Item 4 of Schedule 13D. In Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,"' the target company
alleged that this statement in response to Item 4 was inadequate:
"Upon completion of this Offer, the Company will give considera-
tion to a merger between itself or a subsidiary and Specialty." 117
It contended that this did not adequately convey the intention of the
offeror, which according to Electronic Specialty, was to effect
such a merger. The court held that in view of the state of facts
that existed at the time the statement was made it was sufficient.
A similar claim that the response to Item 4 was insufficient
was asserted in connection with the tender offer of Susquehanna
112 CoD]3 § 1707.041(B)(3)(d) (Page Supp. 1969).
113 Id.
"14 SEC Exchange Act Schedule 13D, Item 4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969),
reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 26,853, at 20,107-4 to -5 (emphasis added).
"15 CODE § 1707.041(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1969).
16 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
17 Id. at 942-43.
THE OHIO ACT
Corp. for stock of Pan American Sulphur Co. Again, the question
was the intention of the tender offeror with regard to the future
of the target company. The district court"8 and a SEC hearing ex-
aminer" 9 determined that the disclosure was insufficient, but the
court of appeals reversed the district court and held that under the
circumstances there had-been compliance with Item 4.1'
Both Item 4 of Schedule 13D and the Ohio Act require (in
the case of the federal law, if the purpose is to acquire control),
description of any plans or proposals which the -purchasers may
have to liquidate the issuer, to sell its assets or to merge it with
any other person, or to make any other major change in its busi-
ness or corporate structure. The Ohio legislation requires in ad-
dition disclosure of. "plans or proposals which the purchaser may
have to make any other major change... in management personnel
or policies of employment."'' Thus an offeror contemplating
changes in management or a cut-back of work forces, among other
things, would have to disclose these plans, though it would appear
such information would be of relevance to executives and commu-
nities where plants are located, but not necessarily to shareholders.
This provision would appear to be related to the statement of State
Representative Richard G. Reichel of Massillon, Ohio, Floor Man-
ager of S.B. 138 in the House, who told of the experience his com-
munity had when a large employer was "gobbled up by Philadelphia
interests," with the result that general offices were dosed in a short
time and later the plant itself (employing 900 persons) was shut
down.2 -
The legislation, however, does not suffer from parochialism to
the extent of the proposed Pennsylvania tender offer bill. This bill
would require the Pennsylvania Securities Commission to make a
determination that the proposed purchase of shares was "fair and
equitable," and it provides that in making such determination the
Commission should consider, among other things:
[WMhether it appears probable that a successful takeover would re-
sult in the complete or partial dosing of plants and offices within
the Commonwealth resulting in unemployment within the Coin-
"18 Pan American Sulphur Co. v. Susquehanna Corp., [Current Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L REP. 5 92,473, at 98,233 (W.D. Tex. May 28, 1969).
19 It re Susquehanna Corp., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REp. 5 77,471,
at 83,692 (SEC Hearing Examiner Aug. 5, 1969).
120 Pan American Sulphur Co. v. Susquehanna Corp., [Current Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 5 92, 610 at 98,749 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1970).
121 CODE § 1707.041(B)(3)(d) (Page Supp. 1969).
12 2 Vorys, supra note 11, at 68.
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monwealth . . . . [W]hether it appears likely that a successful
takeover will reduce the tax revenue to the Commonwealth to the
detriment of the citizens of the Commonwealth .... [W]hether
the acquiring person has made adequate provision for the funding
and payment of all pension and insurance obligations of the corpo-
ration whose securities are proposed to be acquired.'M
(5) "The number of shares of any equity security of the target
company of which each offeror is beneficial or record owner or
has a right to acquire, directly or indirectly, together with the name
and address of each person defined in this section as an offeror."'
124
This is based upon Item 5 of Schedule 13D, although it does not
appear to be as inclusive as that Item.
(6) "Particulars as to any contracts, arrangements, or under-
standings" concerning equity securities of the target company must
be described. 25 This has its origin in its entirety in Item 6 of
Schedule 13D.
(7) "Complete information on the organization and operations
of the offeror, including... year of organization, form of organiza-
tion, jurisdiction in which it is organized [based on Item 7 of Form
S-1], a description of each class of offeror's capital stock and of
its long-term debt [Items 13 and 14 of Form S-1] . . . a brief de-
scription of the location and general character of the principal phys-
ical properties of offeror and its subsidiaries [Item 10 of Form S-i1,
a description of pending legal proceedings [Item 12 of Form S-1]
. . . a brief description of the business done and projected by the
offeror and its subsidiaries and the general development of such
business over the past five years [Item 9 of Form S-11, the names of
all directors and executive officers together with biographical sum-
maries of each for the preceding five years to date [based upon
Item 16 of Form S-1, but encompassing substantially more than
that, such as "biographical summaries" for both officers and di-
rectors which clearly denotes more than the principal occupations
for 5 years for officers and the present principal occupations of
directors as required by Item 16), and the approximate amount of
any material interest, direct or indirect, of any of the directors or
officers in any material transaction during the past three years, or
in any proposed material transactions, to which the offeror or any
of its subsidiaries was or is to be a party [based on Item 20 of Form
123 Pennsylvania H.B. No. 841, § 4(3) (1969 Sess.).
124 CODE § 1707.041(B) (3)(e) (Page Supp. 1969).
1251d. § 1707.041(B)(3)(f).
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S-i, but unlike Item 20 it does not require disclosure of such in-
terests of 10 percent shareholders].' 28
(8) "Financial statements -for the current period and for the
three most recent annual accounting periods."'u2 Form S-1 requires
the inclusion of (1) audited statements of income for 'the regis-
trant's three most recent fiscal years, (2) unaudited statements of
income for "stub" periods in certain circumstances, (3) a 5-year
summary of earnings, (4) an audited balance sheet has of the end
of the most recent fiscal year, and (5) an unaudited balance sheet
at the end of the "stub" period.1 28
It would appear that the requirement of the Ohio Act in some
respects goes beyond the requirements of Form S-1, and in others is
less demanding. What is meant by "financial statements for the
current period"? Presumably financial statements for a current
period are not available until that period ends. Perhaps this means
interim statements for portions of the fiscal year completed - but
how recent? Furthermore, in stating that there must be furnished
"financial statements for the current period and for the three most
recent annual accounting periods," does this mean that not only
must income statements be furnished for these periods, but that
statements of retained earnings and balance sheets with respect to
them must also be furnished? Form 041 adopted by the Division
seeks to eliminate much of this uncertainty by requiring a balance
sheet not older than 6 months and a profit and loss statement for
a year ended not more than 6 months previously. Obviously, this
latter provision might entail preparing a statement for a year other
than the offeror's normal fiscal year. Unlike Form S-1, however, it
does not appear that any of the financial statements required need
be audited, a peculiar omission considering the overall thrust of the
statute.
It would have been desirable if the disclosure requirements of
this statute had been framed so that in the case of an exchange offer
registered with the SEC the submission of the prospectus or the
registration statement might constitute complete compliance with
the disclosure requirements. However, the departures from the
requirements of Form S-1 are of such a nature that if strictly en-
forced a Form S-1 would not constitute full compliance.
126 Id. § 1707.041 (B) (3) (g).
127 Id.
228 SEC Securities Act Form S-1, Item 21 & Insrctions as to Financial Statements,
17 C.F.R. 239.11 (1969), reprinted in 1 CCH FED. SEc. L REP. " 7122, at 6201.
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It is evident, despite the assertion of a defender of the bill to
the contrary,129 that it is not the intention of the statute that all of
the information required to be filed with the Division and the
target company be furnished to shareholders of the target com-
pany. All that is required to be furnished to them is "informa-
tion material to a decision to accept or reject the offer"'130 and it
is required that there be "fair, full, and effective disclosure"'' of
this information. As noted earlier, the original bill submitted re-
quired only that there be filed with the Division and the target
company "copies of all information which such offeror intends to
make public or to transmit to offerees in connection with such
takeover bid."' '2  Those concerned with the carte blanche given
to the Division for determining the information to be submitted
were successful in securing amendment of the legislation to detail
information to be filed with the target company and the Division,
although to some extent their efforts were frustrated by the inclu-
sion of a clause authorizing the Division to require "further docu-
ments, exhibits, data, and information."'' 3  However, despite all
this, the Act still lacks any definition or particularization of the
information to be submitted to the shareholders of the target com-
pany! The only standard is that it must consist of all information
material to a decision to accept or reject the offer. Thus, the mat-
ter has come full circle and presumably the Division remains vested
with complete power to determine how extensive or how limited the
information which actually finds its way into the hands of the share-
holders of the target company shall be.
If it is not intended that all of the information filed with
the Division and the target company be placed in the hands of the
shareholders, then it is difficult to understand why some of the
information required to be submitted is so required. Those items
derived from the schedules adopted under the Williams Act repre-
sent thoughtful responses to the question of what is relevant in the
case of a cash tender offer. However, in many instances the
information derived from Form S-1 is hardly material in the con-
text of a cash tender offer, especially if it appears that there is no
intention on the part of the offeror to accomplish any sort of a
merger with the target company. Of what significance is it where
129 Vorys, supra note 11, at 68.
130 CODE § 1707.041(B) (3) (h) (Page Supp. 1969).
131 Id.
132 See text accompanying note 103 supra.
13 3 CODB § 1707.041(B)(3)(h) (Page Supp. 1969).
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the plants of the offeror are located or what their general character
is or the nature of pending legal proceedings involving the of-
feror or its year of organization, form of organization, or juris-
diction in which it is organized, or a description of the offeror's
capital stock and long-term debt? These are at best of marginal
relevance.
One might conjecture that much of this disclosure is for the
purpose of providing background information to be used by the
Division in making its determination with regard to the quantity,
quality, and character of disclosure proposed to be made to the
shareholders, but even so much of it would appear to be superflu-
ous. Similarly, it might be conjectured, particularly in view of
the 20-day advance filing requirement, that the information is to be
submitted to the target company so that it may have opportunity to
amass arguments to be used in countering the tender offer.
V. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
The most unusual and most commented upon aspects of the
Act are contained in its substantive provisions. Among these is the
provision in subsection 1707.041(B) (2).-l" Under this provision
anyone who owns more than 5 percent of any class of equity
securities of a target company may not make a takeover bid if
during the year preceding commencement of the bid he acquired
any of such securities without either making fair, full, and effective
disclosure to his seller or publicly announcing his intention to ac-
quire control of the target company before making the purchase. It
would appear that the purpose of this provision is to give a seller
the option of holding his security in hopes that a to-be-expected
tender offer may yield a better price for him. Commendable as this
purpose may be, the section is a peculiar one and obviously will have
benefits for the target company of substantial proportions.
The subsection requires disclosure in the described circumstances
of the offeror's "intention to gain control of the target company."1 35
1341d, § 1707.041(B)(2). Mr. Vorys oddly misstates this provision: "Paragraph
(2) of Division (B) establishes, as one of the criteria, the need for a purchaser of shares,
should his shareholdings after such purchase constitute 5 percent or more of the shares
of any class of the target company, to announce publicly his intention to make a take-
over bid or otherwise make fair, full, and effective disclosure of such intention to all
persons from whom he is then purchasing shares if thereafter within one year he wants
to be permitted to make a take-over bid." Vorys, supra note 11, at 70. This interpreta-
tion, patently contrary to the words of the legislation, would not disqualify an offeror
for failing to disclose his intentions in connection with any purchase other than the
one that makes him a 5 percent holder and those thereafter.
135 CODE § 1707.041(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1969).
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This reiterates the draftsmen's assumption that anyone making a
takeover bid is seeking control of the target company. 8" This
assumption is obviously questionable and there have been instances
in which solicitations for tenders were made by offerors not seek-
ing control. Thus, in order to avoid sanitization of a takeover
bid for a year, an offeror might be compelled under the terms of
this statute to utter an untruth; namely, that he intended to seek
control of the target company even though that was not his inten-
tion. Furthermore, even if at the time the takeover bid would be
commenced the offeror had such an intention, it does not follow
that it had that intention at the time it made all preceding acquisi-
tions. For instance, assume that on July 1st company A acquired
100 shares of company B. Thereafter, sometime during the en-
suing year it made a determination to acquire control of company
B, so announced publicly, and accumulated in the market more
than 5 percent of the common stock of company B. Not having
made a public announcement of an intention or having disclosed
to the seller of the 100 shares which it purchased on July 1st that
it intended to gain control (since it did not have such an intention
at that time), company A would be precluded from making a take-
over bid until the following July 1st. This difficulty is com-
pounded when the section is read against the breadth of the de-
finition of "offeror." As noted, offeror includes anyone who
participates in the making of a takeover bid.8 7 Thus, if the
broker employed by the would-be offeror made any purchase of
shares of the target company, for anyone and for any purpose,
without disclosing an intention to acquire control, either the
takeover bid would be prohibited for a year from the time of such
purchase or the offeror would have to dispense with the services
of the broker.
From a narrowly technical standpoint the section suffers from
other deficiencies. It speaks of one who "owns" more than 5
percent of a class of equity securities of a target company without
specifying the nature of ownership, record or beneficial. Further-
more, the class of equity security of the target company which the
offeror owns in excess of 5 percent need not be the same class as
that with respect to which the takeover bid is made. Thus, owner-
ship of more than 5 percent of a class of warrants outstanding
'
3 6 The assumption is expressed in two subsections of the Act. Id. §§ 1707.041
(B) (2), (B) (3) (d). For a discussion of the latter, see text accompanying note 112
supra.
137 See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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or of a class of convertible debentures might effectively prevent
the making of a takeover bid for common stock, even though the
common stock into which the warrant or debenture is convertible
would be an infinitesimal part of the total common stock of the
target company and would afford little leverage on control.
From a practical standpoint, of course, anyone contemplating
a tender offer on a company covered by the Act will be careful not
to accumulate more than 5 percent of any class of equity security
of the target company. It would appear that prevention of un-
publicized accumulation is the real thrust of this provision; the
only ones, then, who may be victimized by this provision are
those who make acquisitions without an intent to acquire control
and who later formulate such an intention and wish to make a
takeover bid. Candor would surely have been better served if the
legislature had simply required a public disclosure of holdings
when anyone exceeded 5 percent ownership. At the present time
Congress has under consideration an amendment to the Williams
Act which would have the effect of requiring disclosure of hold-
ings when they exceeded 5 percent rather than 10 percent as at
present. as This proposal would also require a filing under the
Williams Act if a tender offeror sought to acquire more than 5
percent of a class.
A further apparent inconsistency in this section of the Act is
the use of 5 percent as the critical amount while 10 percent is the
measuring rod in determining when a takeover bid must comply
with the filing and disclosure requirements. Under federal law,
accumulation disclosure provisions and the takeover bid provisions
presently focus on the same amount, and the proposed amendments
would continue to keep them consistent.
Obviously the alternative to public disclosure, "fair, full, and
effective" disdosure to the seller, poses difficult problems, partic-
ularly when the purchase is in the organized securities markets. In
that case, because of the difficulties of identifying the seller,
public disclosure of intent may be the only course open to a would-
be offeror, with possible adverse effects on the market. As was
pointed out earlier,139 the necessity of "fair, full, and effective"
disclosure of an intention to acquire control limits only disclosure
to the seller and does not limit public announcement; hence, pre-
sumably the standard to which public disclosure must conform is
138 S. 3431, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
13 9 See text accompanying note 84 supra.
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less rigorous than that to which private disdosure to a seller must
adhere.
Admittedly "hotly contested in the Legislature"' 40 was the pro-
vision incorporated in the bill that:
EN]o offeror shall make a take-over bid which is not made to all
holders residing in this state of the equity security that is the sub-ject of such take-over bid, or which is not made to such holders on
the same terms as such take-over bid is made to holders of such
equity security not residing in this state. 41
At first blush this might seem to be a relatively toothless provi-
sion. Assume that an offeror made a takeover bid addressed to
all shareholders in the other 49 states and simply refrained from
making it in Ohio. What action could be taken under this law to
frustrate the offer in the other 49 states? The ingenuity of the
advocates of the bill sparkled most clearly in this provision. Their
reasoning is best summarized by one of their number:
Section 1707.19 of the securities law provides for revocation of a
dealer's Ohio license if he violates any of Ohio's securities laws.
An out-of-state dealer, licensed in Ohio, who participates in a
takeover bid for an Ohio or Ohio-based corporation will, pursuant
to the definition of "Offeror" .. . be required to comply with the
new law or risk losing his Ohio license. This, it seems to me, is
the real deterrent to discrimination against Ohio shareholders by
any out-of-state takeover bidder making a bid for an Ohio or Ohio-
based corporation but excepting from his offer all shares held by
Ohio residents.142
While many would question the desirability of state tender
offer legislation, few would question the interest of a state in pro-
tecting resident shareholders against unfair conduct. However,
does this interest justify seeking to extend the consequences of such
protection to the shareholders in all other 49 states? Recognizing
the problems of policing offerors who chose to ignore Ohio in
making tender offers, the sponsors of the bill sought at least to
remove from the arena any dealers holding Ohio licenses and sought
to exact as the penalty for participating in an offer that ignores
Ohio shareholders the loss of their license. The word "arrogance"
immediately leaps to mind as descriptive of this effort. Thus, if a
corporation sought to make a takeover bid for a corporation organ-
ized in Ohio but with few shareholders in the state, it would none-
theless be a violation for the offer to be made in the other 49
140 Vorys, supra note 11, at 70.
141 CODE § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1969).
142 Vorys, supra note 11, at 21.
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states and not in Ohio. Lacking the practical means of getting at
the offeror, the statute would permit getting at those who might
be regarded as participating or aiding in making the bid, and if
any of them happened to be licensed as dealers under the Ohio
Securities Law they could be subjected to discipline, up to and in-
cluding revocation of their licenses.
If the offeror does without the services of an Ohio-licensed
dealer and makes its offer in the other states but not in Ohio,
what would be the consequences for Ohio shareholders? They
would either be totally denied the benefits of the offer, or, more
likely, they would sell their shares in the market at a price reflect-
ing the tender offer price, but somewhat below it, depending
upon the expectations of the securities markets with respect to the
outcome of the offer. The stock of the Ohio shareholder would
undoubtedly end up in the hands of the arbitrageurs, who could be
counted on to tender it in response to the tender. Hence, there
would be two consequences: (1) The Ohio shareholder would re-
ceive something less than the shareholders in other states who
could accept the tender offer, and (2) the probability of success
of the tender offer would be promoted because the stock would
reach persons almost certain to tender. The only loser - the
Ohio shareholder. 43
In addition to these substantive provisions there are less con-
troversial ones cribbed almost verbatim from the Williams Act.
If the tender offer is for less than all outstanding equity securities
of a class, and if more than the amount sought are tendered in the
first 10 days, all tendered within that time must be accepted pro
rata; the same provision applies with respect to those deposited
within 10 days after an increase in consideration.' 44  If the terms
of the bid are changed before expiration by increasing the con-
sideration offered, the offeror shall pay the increased considera-
143 This posture is in interesting contrast with that taken by California under its new
securities law:
[D]enial of the tender offer in California may be ineffective to deny the trans-
action unless there are a substantial number of security holders in California.
The Commissioner will take into account that the effect of denial of such tender
offer may result in forcing the California security holders into a minority po-
sition with respect to a subsidiary corporation of the tenderor. Therefore the
Commissioner may waive full compliance in a particular case with all of the
standards of fairness in the Rules to permit California security holders the
opportunity to exchange their securities on the same basis as non-resident
security holders. M. MARSH & R. VoLK,, PRAcric UNDER THE CALiORN A
SEcuRrrms LAW OF 196& at 295 (1969).
144 CODE § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1969).
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tion for all equity securities taken up.145 The statute contains no
withdrawal provisions comparable to those in the Williams Act.146
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
In addition to other powers given to the Division, the Act pro-
vides that, pursuant to sections 119.01 to 119.131,7 of the Code
(the Administrative Procedure Act), the Division may prescribe
"reasonable" rules and regulations, such as:
(1) Defining fraudulent, evasive, deceptive, or grossly unfair
practices in connection with take-over bids, and the terms
used in this section;
(2) Exempting from this section, take-over bids not made for the
purpose of, and not having the effect of, changing or influ-
encing the control of a target company;
(3) Covering such other matters as have been necessary to give
effect to this section. 148
Categories 2 and 3 are reasonably unexceptionable. However,
the first provision may through inadvertance or otherwise invite
an exercise in futility for, while the Division may define "fraudu-
lent, evasive, deceptive, or grossly unfair practices" in connection
with takeover bids, it is not dear that the statute makes any such
practice unlawful or gives the Division enforcement powers if it
defines such practices and thereafter makes a determination that
someone has been guilty of them.49 It is difficult to believe that
such an omission was deliberate; hence, it appears that it should
join other instances in which incongruities, inconsistencies and gaps
appear in the legislation.
One of the grave shortcomings of this legislation, particularly
as contrasted with the Williams Act, is its failure to regulate in
any fashion whatsoever the conduct of the target company prior
to and during the tender offer. Under the Williams Act "[alny
solicitation or recommendation to the holders of such a security
[one which is the subject of a tender offer] to accept or reject the
tender offer . . . shall be made in accordance with such rules and
145 Id.
146 Exchange Act§ 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969).
147 CODE § 119.01-.13 (Page 1969).
148 Id. § 1707.041 (F) (Page Supp. 1969). It should be noted that item (2) is based
on Exchange Act § 14(d)(8)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8)(D) (Supp. IV, 1969).
149 CODE § 1707.19 (Page 1964) might be construed to permit suspension and re-
vocation of a dealer's license if he violated such a determination by the Division since
it provides for such a remedy if a dealer "has intentionally violated any provision of
sections 1707.01 to 1707.45, inclusive, of the Revised Code, or any regulation or order
made thereunder...." Id. § 1707.19(D).
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regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."'50
Pursuant to this the SEC has required the filing of Schedule 14D
by anyone who makes a recommendation with regard to a tender
offer.' 5 ' In addition, under section 14(e) of the Williams Act:
[It is unlawful for anyone to] make any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, de-
ceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation
of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer,
request or invitation. -52
It is evident that section_14(e) is intended to govern the conduct
not only of offerors but of target companies as well. -
Unlike the Williams Act, the Act contains no suggestion that
the Division might by rule regulate the conduct of the target com-
pany. As noted,153 it may define certain undesirable conduct -
presumably including conduct of the target company - but there
is no provision for any sanctions if. the rules are violated; it may
exempt takeover bids not intended to affect control; and it may
make rules "covering such other matters as are necessary to give
effect to this section." I54  In view of the express purpose of the
legislation ("protecting shareholders . . . by requiring public an-
nouncement and fair, full, and effective disclosure to such share-
holders prior to the making of take-over bids")' 5 and the express
imposition of burdens only on the offeror, it is doubtful if the
Division would consider rules governing the target company as
"necessary to give effect to this section."
There is in the Act no requirement for advance filing and
clearance of any communications proposed to be made to its share-
holders by a target company and there is not even a prohibition
against the use of fraudulent means in opposing a tender offer.
Thus, from 20 days prior to the proposed commencement of the
tender offer the target company will be fully apprised of the in-
tentions of the offeror (the period may be much longer as a con-
'B0 xchange Act § 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (Supp. IV, 1969).
151 SEC Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1970), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. J 26,887, at 20,152.
152 Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV, 1969).
'
5 3 See text accompanying note 148 supra.
154 CODE § 1707.041(F) (3) (Page Supp. 1969).
'55 Amend. Sub. S.B. No. 138, File No. 90 (Reg. Sess. 1969-70).
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sequence of subsection 1707.041 (B) (4)) "' and will be possessed of
extensive information concerning it and its proposed offer. From
then on it can range as freely as it wishes and use whatever means
it wishes to oppose the offer, while the offeror is subject to the
multiple restraints discussed above. In this particular the legisla-
tion reaches its zenith in protecting incumbent management.
VII. REMEDIES
Section (E) provides that "an offeror is subject to the liability
and penalties applicable to a seller and an offeree is entitled to
the remedies applicable to a purchaser, as set forth in sections
1707.041 [a mistake in the official version of the statute: it was
intended to read section 1707.41] to 1707.44, inclusive, of the Re-
vised Code."'157 In this connection it should be noted that with
the exception of this effort to read the general liability and
penalty sections of the Ohio Securities Law into the Act, there are
no sections creating liabilities or penalties for violation of the
tender offer law. Thus, if this technique is not effective, there
are no liabilities or penalties; the only other penalty section in
the Securities Law, section 1707.99158 which creates criminal pen-
alties, makes it a crime to commit any of the acts described in
section 1707.44 and hence is effective only if the grafting effort is
accomplished.
Section 1707.41 sets forth the civil liability of a "seller" for
fraud; 5' section 1707.42 sets forth the civil liability for someone
who acts as an advisor with regard to a sale of a security;1' ° sec-
tion 1707.43 describes the remedies of a purchaser in an unlawful
sale;'' and section 1707.44 describes conduct which may constitute
a violation.0 2 No attempt will be made to parse in detail the dif-
ficulties of effectuating the deceptively simple effort to transpose
"offeror" for "seller" and "offeree" for "purchaser." However,
it should be noted there is more involved in these sections than
simply these terms; there is conduct described which if engaged in
156 CODE § 1707.041 (B) (4) (Page Supp. 1969) prescribes a 60-day period for
adjudication by the Division and that the adjudication shall be subject to judicial re-
view under the Administrative Procedure Act [id. §§ 119.01-.13 (Page 1969)].
157 Id. § 1707.041(E) (Page Supp. 1969).
158 Id. § 1707.99 (Page 1964).
159 Id. § 1707.41.
160 Id. § 1707.42.
161 Id. § 1707.43.
16 2 Id. § 1707.44.
THE OHIO ACT
constitutes a basis for liability or penalty and this conduct is de-
scribed in terms of sales of securities, and it is at least highly ques-
tionable whether the verbal transpositions set forth in the statute
have the effect by implication of turning upside down the conduct
described and reading words as if they applied to tender offers.
For instance, section 1707.42 provides:
Whoever, with intent to secure financial gain to himself, advises
and procures any person to purchase any security, and receives any
commission or reward for such advice or services without disclosing
to the purchaser the fact of his agency or his interest in such sales,
shall be liable to such purchaser for the amount of such purchaser's
damages thereby, upon tender of such security to and suit brought
against, such adviser, by such purchaser. 1 3
Can this really be read as applying to cash tender offers, so that
anyone who advises an offeree to accept a tender offer without dis-
dosing his interest may be subject to a claim? Does it apply to
someone who advises against acceptance? Further, section 1707.43
provides:
The person making such sale or contract for sale, and every person
who has participated in or aided the seller in any way in making
such sale or contract for sale, are jointly and severally liable to such
purchaser, in an action at law in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion, upon tender to the seller in person or in open court of the
securities sold or of the contract made, for the full amount paid by
the purchaser .... ,164
Again, does the entire sentence turned upside down and around and
about become applicable to tender offers?
The Legislative Service Commission commented on this proce-
dure:
Under Ohio law, a criminal law is unconstitutional unless it states
a positive prohibition or duty. It is questionable, at best, whether
the prohibitions and duties in the bill can be made to mesh exactly
with the liabilities and penalties in the existing law, since the bill
deals with subject matter not contemplated when the original se-
curities laws were passed. The same difficulty renders existing
remedies of doubtful applicability.' 6 5
VIII. SPECIAL PRovIsIoNs
The Act contains special provisions with regard to regulated
industries. Consistent with the approach otherwise taken in the
163 Id. § 1707.42.
' 4d. § 1707.43.
165 Legislative Service Commission, supra note 24.
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Ohio Securities Law,16 6 the Superintendent of Insurance is substi-
tuted for the Division if either the offeror or the target company
is an insurance company.167  The Act is made specifically inappli-
cable when the offeror or the target company is a public utility or
a public utility holding company as defined in the federal Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,168 is a bank or a bank hold-
ing company subject to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,69
or is a savings and loan holding company as defined in the Savings
and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967.1' In any of
the above events the bid is subject to approval by the appropriate
federal agency, or if the offeror and the target company are banks
and the offer is part of a merger transaction, subject to approval
by appropriate federal supervisory authorities.
IX. CONCLUSION
This discussion has not dealt with broad policy questions: are
tender offers good or bad for the American economy, or perhaps
more specifically, for the Ohio economy? To what extent should
regulation of tender offers go beyond simply seeking to preserve
a reasonable balance between the interests of shareholders, man-
agement and would-be offerors? To what extent should such
legislation go beyond merely requiring disclosure? Rather, the
discussion has been confined largely to considering the particular
legislation incorporated in section 1707.041. Careful analysis of this
Act would suggest that it is "special interest" legislation sailing
under different colors, weighted obviously to protect incumbent
management from attack. This is accomplished largely under the
fiction of requiring fair disclosure to shareholders. The disclos-
ure method, however, is of such a nature, and the procedures are
so designed that they accomplish a substantive result not encom-
passed in the expressed purpose of the legislation - the discour-
agement, nay, the prohibition in effect, of tender offers. Disclos-
ure is not the real aim. The real aim is the protection of incumbent
management from intruders. The legislation places in the Division
vast discretion, the exercise of which may easily result, not in placing
166 CODE § 1707.32 (Page 1964).
167 Id. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1969).
168 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1964).
169 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1964).
170 12 U.S.C. § 1730a (1969).
171 CODE § 1707.041(H) (Page Supp. 1969).
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information in the hands of shareholders, but in denying them the
opportunity to avail themselves of attractive opportunities.
At the moment tender offers are less frequent than they were
and hence the yearning of management for protection is less in-
tense. It is not unlikely, however, that when they again become
favored instruments for accomplishing changes of control, Ohio's
legislation will become the model for other states. Such a multi-
plication of legislation with the shortcomings of this legislation
could only be unfortunate.
For all of its shortcomings, it has been stated that the Ohio
Act is "more sophisticated than Federal laws covering the same
grounds." 72
So be it.
172 Vorys, .upra note 11, at 65.
